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So, North Korea has been warned: it will pay an "unimaginable price" if it dares to conduct a fourth nuclear test, as Yun Byung-se, South Korea's foreign minister said recently.
Minister Yun seems to be in good company while making such dire warnings. North Korea hinting that a new nuclear test is expected to take place soon, and the outside world reacts to these indications in a very predictable manner. In recent weeks, North Korean ambassadors in a number of countries, including Germany, the U.K., and perhaps even China, were summoned by the governments of their host nations who explained to them that North Korea would suffer grievously, if it dared to conduct another nuclear test.
This campaign reminds me of "Team America: World Police," a 2004 movie and an amusing satire of modern politics, in which the late Kim Jong-il, father of the current Kim, is one of the main characters. In a scene from the movie, a U.N. representative threatens the North Korean strongman, demanding compliance with U.N. regulations, "or else we will write you a letter, telling you how angry we are".
I believe that this exchange nicely encapsulates the essence of the above mentioned diplomatic actions.
Indeed, North Korea is not going to pay an unimaginable price for a nuclear test, in fact, it is probably not going to pay any price at all: the international community is helpless, and Pyongyang is well aware of this.
If a nuclear test is actually conducted, there will be another meeting of the U.N. Security Council, which will vote for tougher sanctions against North Korea. However, North Korea has been under sanctions since 2006, and these sanctions have yet to have any real impact on the country's economic performance. On the contrary, from around 2006, North Korea's economic recovery from the famine of the 1990s began to accelerate, the elite and even normal people started to consume more and live better. This fact alone speaks volumes about the effectiveness of such sanctions.
One of the major reasons why sanctions are ineffective is China. Recently, there has been much speculation about the possibility of the new leadership in Beijing being willing to punish Pyongyang for its nuclear ambitions. Surely, Xi Jinping is no great admirer of the Kim dynasty. Nonetheless, being a responsible politician, he cares above all about his country's strategic interests, and such interests require him to remain cautious in his dealings with Kim Jong-un.
China is now, for all practical purposes, the sole provider of aid to North Korea. It is also North Korea's only significant trade partner. This does not mean, however, that China can use this apparent economic leverage over North Korea to influence the latter. It is highly likely that reduction in Chinese aid and/or trade will probably slow down or even reverse the slow growth of the North Korean economy. Such economic decline, however, is unlikely to make North Korea's leadership change its attitude toward its nuclear weapons program.
The North Korean government is well aware that nuclear weapons are a crucial ingredient its survival. Hence, North Korea's leadership is not going to surrender their nuclear deterrent to ameliorate the sufferings of the politically powerless North Korean people. In their turn, the average North Korean, even if they suffer from economic hardships as a result of sanctions, is unlikely to be able to influence regime policy in Pyongyang.
Thus, only a dramatic reduction of aid and trade might have a real political impact on North Korea. A dramatic reduction may provoke domestic discontent and instability. However, China has every reason to wish to avoid this.
North Korea's nuclear program is a nuisance for China, but Beijing faces the unenviable choice between three possibilities: (1) an adventurous, nuclear, but stable North Korea; (2) North Korea in a state of anarchy and collapse; (3) North Korea under South Korean domination, as an ally of the United States.
Of all the three options, the first is, of course, the least unacceptable in Beijing which is, therefore, a status quo power when it comes to North Korean matters. Hence, we should not expect China to suddenly become supportive of international sanctions.
Therefore, we can be pretty sure: if the North Korean government believes that it has valid technological, military and/or diplomatic reasons to conduct a nuclear test, it need not worry about the menacing warnings it now gets from the international community. No one is in a position to meaningfully punish them for another nuclear test, and they are perfectly aware of this.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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