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Over the last two years or so, one of the major topics that Pyongyangologists have loved to speculate about is the extent to which Kim Jong-un is in charge in North Korea.
Indeed, there were some reasons to doubt whether the young leader of North Korea was capable and willing to control the much older, more experienced and highly Machiavellian bureaucracy that he inherited from his father.
At the time of Kim Jong-un's ascension to power, there was a nearly universal belief (shared by among others yours truly) that Kim would be guided, controlled and where necessary restricted by veteran bureaucrats.
However, things have turned out quite unexpectedly: while the controlling and mighty magnates of the Kim Jong-il era remained for the first few months of Kim Jong-un's rule, they were very soon subdued by the young leader (who has thus far proven himself to be tough, ruthless and highly manipulative despite his age and background). The old guard disappeared with remarkable speed.
In December 2011, four top military and three top civilian dignitaries followed the hearse of the deceased Kim Jong-il. Two years later, only two of them were still present at the apex of power in Pyongyang. The top military leader at the funeral, Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho, was purged in December 2012.
The most important of all civilian bureaucrats, Jang Song-thaek, followed one year later (as a matter of fact, in a far more spectacular way, being publically accused of manifold crimes and executed after a short trial).
Many gestures of the young leader have further demonstrated that he is the one in charge.
Take, for example, the frequent trips of Dennis Rodman to North Korea. Kim Jong-un was a teenager in the glory days of Rodman, and Kim is also virtually the only person in the North Korean leadership who is likely to have any interest in meeting the American basketball star.
Many Americans might fancy that Rodman is known all over the globe, but one can be pretty sure that most North Korean officials (as well as the present author himself) had never heard Rodman's name before the latter's personal encounter with Kim.
Policy-wise, the Rodman trips do not make much sense. Indeed, open interactions with the strange-looking and highly eccentric foreigners are not wise behaviors from an apprentice dictator.
It can therefore be surmised that had North Korea's elite enjoyed enough control over Kim's decisions, they would never have allowed him to appear in public with Rodman.
Nonetheless, this is what happened, and this was obviously to satisfy the young leader's curiosity and perhaps living out one of his teenage dreams.
Among other actions that were clearly the result of Kim's own ambitions and dreams, one should also mention his unprecedented decision to introduce his wife to the North Korean audience.
Another example is a 2012 concert in which the Moranbong ensemble performed American cult classics while being surrounded by pop culture Americana (like Mickey Mouse, Snow White and the like).
It must be remembered that all of the above was broadcast on North Korean official television, and some of it even ended up on the front of North Korea's official newspaper, The Rodong Shinmun.
The recent removal and judicial murder of Jang deserves special mention in this regard. Jang was the experienced, corrupt and older uncle of the young leader.
The manner of his purge, highly public, has finally put to rest the idea that the young marshal is not in complete control of the North Korean state.
Whether you like it or not, it is abundantly clear that Kim is in charge now. Within his domain, he might be the most powerful of all monarchs and dictators alive today.
It remains to be seen how he will use his power. However, it seems that his personality is very different from his father and grandfather. He appears both decisive and ruthless, but it is not clear whether he has a clear understanding of how the modern international community operates.
Nonetheless, it is time that we admit it: the supreme leader, first secretary of the Korean Worker's Party, first chairman of the National Defense Commission, supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the KWP and marshal of the DPRK is very much in charge in Pyongyang.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.