.jpg/dims/resize/740/optimize) |
On Jan. 16, the National Defense Commission (NDC) ― the supreme executive of the North Korean state ― addressed the South Korean government with an important initiative. It suggested that both Koreas should undertake decisive actions to improve relations.
First, it was proposed that after coming lunar New Year (Jan. 30) both sides should cease hostile propaganda and also refrain from military activities directed at the other.
There is little doubt what the latter is supposed to mean. In February, South Korea and the United States are scheduled to hold joint military exercises Key Resolve and Foal Eagle. In other words, the North has suggested that the South should cancel these military exercises at the last minute.
What for? The North suggested that the implementation of such peace-building measures will solve virtually all other problems in North-South relations, including the long delayed meeting of divided families.
This attractive proposal has one serious shortcoming: it is completely unacceptable to the South, and the proposal's authors are perfectly aware of this. Joint maneuvers take place every year approximately at this time, and the sudden cancelation of these exercises is unthinkable since it would be seen as a serious blow to the U.S.-ROK alliance.
At the same time, the North Korean side threatened the South Koreans with "nuclear calamity" that would follow if military exercises go ahead as planned.
All of this has made many observers quite tense, since it looks like an attempt to gain the moral high ground before launching a new chain of provocations somewhat similar to what we saw last year.
The consequences are clear.
First, the North Korean government makes a proposal that it knows to be unacceptable.
Second, the rejection of such a proposal is interpreted as a sign of hostile intentions and as a sign of unwillingness to solve inter-Korean issues peacefully.
Third, any military clash or exchange of fire is presented as initiated or provoked by the South ― the latter's alleged unwillingness to cooperate having been shown to the world.
Such a line of reasoning is not unfounded; indeed a re-run of last year's crisis remains a possibility. The North Korean government needs cohesion and unity more than ever following the sudden purge and execution of Jang Song-thaek.
Since time immemorial, politicians have known that a real or alleged external threat is the best way to enforce unity and cohesion at home. North Koreans therefore indeed might attempt to produce another manageable crisis.
However, there is still good reason to be less pessimistic about the current situation. It is quite possible that the North Korean government sincerely wants improvement of its relations with the South. The North Korean elite might need unity and cohesion, but they also need money from the outside world.
Contrary to what is widely believed, North Korea is not a "starving and destitute country" anymore ― these days it is merely destitute. While the economic situation has improved, it remains extremely precarious, and the country remains in need of foreign aid and assistance.
Over the late five to six years, China has been the near sole provider of such aid and assistance. As a result, North Korea's economic dependence of China has reached hitherto unprecedented levels (and such a change is decisively unwelcome in Pyongyang).
During the Jang Song-thaek affair, the North Korean government clearly demonstrated its intention to distance itself from China ― the latter's trade policy was implicitly criticised in the North Korean media.
While the North Korean government still occasionally daydreams about Western investors, these are unlikely to come. The only alternative therefore appears to be South Korean money. Better relations with the South are better indeed.
Of course, it is not a wise idea to start negotiations by putting clearly unacceptable ideas on the table. However, it might be a kind of negotiating tactic; the idea being first to make an unacceptable proposal and after it is predictably rejected by the other side, use the rejection to gain some high ground, thus making the next stage of negotiations somewhat easier (especially if some support from South Korean society can be enlisted).
So what does this all mean? Are North Korean leaders paving the way for a new round of provocations and bellicosity likely to occur in the next few months? Or are they really going to improve relations with the South? The answers to these questions will be known quite soon, but right now all we can do is hope for the best.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
