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The political history of North Korea in 1945-1960 was, first and foremost, the history of factional struggle.
This is admitted even by the North Korean official history. It insists that Kim Il-sung as a true bearer of the Communist and Juche spirit eventually unmasked the hidden enemies within the party and created a monolith leadership which led the DPRK to new victories.
One has to agree: Kim created a monolith leadership even if it opens to questioning whether it led North Korea to victories or disasters. Until around 1990, this leadership overwhelmingly consisted of former guerrillas, veterans of Manchurian resistance of the 1930s ― and now their children and grandchildren are running the country.
Four clearly defined groups were jockeying for power in North Korean leadership between 1945 and 1960. The first was the "Soviet group" which included the Soviet citizens of Korean extraction who in 1945-1950 were sent to Korea by the Kremlin to act as advisors and controllers of the nascent Communist government.
The second group, known as the "domestic faction", included former underground Communist activists who operated in Korea during the colonial era and/or were engaged in leftist activity in the U.S.-dominated South in 1945-1950.
The third, "Yeonan group" included ethnic Korean Communists who prior to 1945 took part in the Chinese revolutionary movement. The fourth group, the "guerrillas" consisted of fighters who were engaged in the guerrilla campaign in Manchuria in the 1930s, then fled to the USSR around 1940 and came back in 1945 together with Kim.
For an informed observer in, say, 1948, the "guerrilla faction" appeared to be the least powerful. It had a number of handicaps which made the former guerrillas unlikely candidates for the top positions in the country.
First of all, they were poorly educated. According to Wada Haruki, a leading expert in the history of the North Korean guerrilla movement, only one of all guerrillas is known to have had college education, and only a handful of them ever studied in secondary schools.
For most of them, their education was limited to crash courses at the guerrilla camps where they studied the basics of literacy, heavily mixed with indoctrination in the grossly simplified Leninist theory. The rival groups included brilliant intellectuals, graduates of the best Japanese, Chinese and Russian universities.
Secondly, their Manchurian experience was not initially seen as terribly significant. In later eras, the North Korean official media blew the importance of Manchurian struggle out of all proportions, but back in the 1930s and 1940s, Manchuria was perceived as a backwater (and rightly so). The Communist operations in China were of much greater scale and political significance.
Thirdly, the guerrillas lacked any meaningful experience necessary for a ranking state official. They never were administrators, unlike the Soviet Koreans most of whom were seasoned bureaucrats.
Even their military experience was limited and perhaps irrelevant. They were never involved in a large-scale regular warfare, since most of the guerrilla operations were hit-and-run raids. These required great courage, physical stamina, determination and individual fighting skills, but hardly were conducive for making people into strategists of modern warfare. Meanwhile, the "Yeonan faction" boasted a number of people who were ranking officers in the Chinese Communist Forces and for years used to command large regular units.
Thus, back in the late 1940s the guerrillas appeared unlikely to win the power struggle. But they won nonetheless. Prof. Haruki once aptly described North Korea as a "guerrilla state." Indeed, between 1960 and 1990 an overwhelming majority of the top government position belonged to the former Manchurian guerrillas.
Only in the 1980s, age and death began to push them away from politics. All their rivals ― brilliant intellectuals, experienced bureaucrats, wise generals ― were purged to be executed or, if they were lucky, to die in exile.
What were the reasons for this unlikely success? A short answer is: "Kim Il-sung." The Great Leader always relied on the ex-guerrillas whom alone he could trust completely.
Kim initially became the North Korean dictator due to sheer luck and his good rapport with the Soviet military. Sheer luck played a major role in his initial ascent to the supreme power.
However, once in this position, he proved himself a superb master of Machiavellian politics. His charisma was important as well. And, last but not least, Kim's specific blend of leftist radicalism and Korean nationalism won much support of the masses and, more importantly, officialdom.
At any rate, Kim won, and his family stays in control of the country up to this day.
Prof. Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.