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As most of readers will still vividly remember, the world media assured us that the Korean Peninsula was on the brink of war five months ago.
The North Korean government made one bellicose statement after another. At one point, the plump and not particularly menacing-looking figure of Kim Jong-un was shown on North Korean state TV in front of a large map, which indicated the U.S. cities destined to suffer nuclear bombardment in the immediate future at the hands of the Korean People's Army.
Apart from the usual suspects of New York and Washington, the city of Austin, Texas, somehow found its way onto the target list.
Dozens of journalists flocked to Seoul in March and April in order to report the alleged "crisis in Korea." However, many of them were surprised and bemused to discover that neither the local expert community nor the South Korean public in general showed the slightest hint of unease or fear. Seoul has seen similar developments many times and the average Seoulite was either disinterested, or merely assumed that it was another North Korean diplomatic ruse. This assumption has been proven correct.
Indeed, whenever North Korea wishes to wring concessions from the outside world they first start by manufacturing a crisis. They do this by doing one or more of the following: launch missiles, torpedo ships, test nuclear weapons, and/or shower their diplomatic mark with threats. All this is rather reminiscent of the threatening "huka" war dance of the Maori. As every Maori chief knew, the dance was as a necessary prelude for any serious negotiations.
Once North Korea's opposition feels suitably worried and menaced by the mounting crisis, North Korea suddenly quietens down and offers negotiations. They obviously hope that the other side will be willing to make concessions having been reminded of how dangerous the North Koreas can be.
This is very much how things have actually turned out this time, too. North Korea's outpouring of threats abruptly stopped in mid-April, and within a month, North Korean diplomats began their charm offensive _ insisting that their sole goal was negotiation and compromise.
They even suggested that the six-party talks be resumed. It should be remembered that the North had previously declared the six-party talks to be useless but a few years ago.
In dealing with South Korea, the North Koreans have since proposed that the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC) be reopened, that family reunions between divided families resume, and also suggested the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tours. The two sides have already agreed to reopen the GIC, and agreements on the latter two issues are quite likely in the near future.
It is quite understandable why North Korea needs such agreements. Under the Lee Myung-bak administration, exchanges between the two states were practically frozen, and this made North Korea more dependent on China. Contrary to what is commonly thought, this did not make North Korean leaders happy.
Pyongyang does not trust China, and would rather have multiple sponsors whose disagreements can be exploited to North Korea's advantage. Therefore, South Korean money was most welcome, and there is little doubt that in the future they will also try to secure some aid from the United States too.
So, was this business as usual in Korea this spring and summer, just another run of the same old performance? Yes, but only to a certain extent. This crisis was remarkable in one regard: the tension-building stage was marked by an unusual intensity. It felt like decision makers in Pyongyang turned the volume up as high as possible.
This might be explained by the lack of experience in North Korea's current leader. It seems likely however that North Korean strategists have come to understand that the old strategy has begun to yield fewer returns.
Ten or 15 years ago, Pyongyang's theatrics were taken seriously in both Washington and Seoul, but this is not the case anymore. While Seoul agreed to re-start joint cooperation projects, it did not do this because it believed that if it did otherwise Seoul would become a "sea of fire" ― even though this is what North Korean propaganda said explicitly in March. Rather, the revival of such exchanges was Park Geun-hye's intention before she was even elected.
The old strategy is certainly not as effective as it used to be, but it does not mean that it does not work. Therefore, in a few years' time, one could expect another repeat: seemingly irrational belligerence, in quick succession followed by broad smiles.
Prof. Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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