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Over the last 15 years or so, China has been the major variable when it comes to analyzing and understanding the North Korean question. Indeed, China has all but monopolized North Korea's foreign trade ― making up some 85 percent of total. In recent years, it has remained almost the sole provider of aid to North Korea as well.
Therefore, for many years China has been seen as the problem in Washington, Seoul and other major Western capitals. It was widely believed that Chinese direct and indirect aid has helped North Korea to stay afloat.
However, in recent months one has seen a sudden change of mood among Western decision-makers and analysts. Instead of whining about China's obstructionism, the same people have begun to express their hopes that China can and probably will play a major role in solving the North Korean problem – i.e. pushing North Korea towards denuclearization.
At first glance, such expectations do not appear to be without foundation. Over the last year, China's approach to North Korea has changed significantly indeed.
In the last few months, the Chinese media has published a number of articles that were critical of North Korean behavior, and Chinese diplomats have begun to talk about their supposedly erstwhile ally in a remarkably harsh tone. Obviously, North Korean's leadership took measures to placate Beijing, two high-level officials visited in May and June.
While in Beijing, these officials delivered statements of a rather unusually conciliatory tone. In one case, Choe Ryong-hae, head of the General Political Department of the Korean People's Army, even went so far as to state that North Korea would like to return to the six-party talks. In another case, Kim Gye-gwan, deputy foreign minister, said that North Korea would like to work toward solving the nuclear issue (the latter statement is deliberately nebulous, but also conciliatory in tone).
It is not incidental that both statements were delivered in Beijing, obviously the North Koreans wanted to show their irritated Chinese sponsors that they are willing to negotiate and make concessions.
However, one should not pin too much hope on changes in China's attitude towards Pyongyang. China is clearly annoyed by North Korea's stubborn unwillingness to halt or at least slow down their nuclear program, as well as by tension-making diplomacy that is designed to manufacture crises in Northeast Asia. China is not happy when it sees that such behavior results in an increase in the U.S. military presence in the area and also creates a convenient pretext for the United States to roll out their missile defense systems.
But all of this is essentially emotion, and Great Powers are not normally driven by emotions when it comes to making strategic decisions.
Like it or not, the continued division of the Korean peninsula, as well as the continued existence of a separate, anti-American state in its northern part do serve China's geopolitical interests quite well. It is true that China will probably accept a unified Korea if unification is to happen. But unification is clearly not a desirable immediate outcome for Beijing.
A unified Korean state is likely to be democratic and nationalistic. It is also highly likely that such a state will make some territorial claims over Chinese territories ― as many Korean nationalists have already. It is also quite likely that a unified Korea will remain an ally of the United States, the major geopolitical rival of China.
The emergence of such a state is clearly not something that China's strategists will welcome. However, excessive pressure on North Korea could result in the emergence of such a state. If China gets serious about economic pressure, it may decide to halt all aid to North Korea, as well as to stop subsidizing interactions between Chinese companies and this reclusive country.
As experience has shown, only such drastic measures have some chance of changing North Korea's attitude to the nuclear issue. However, the very same measures are also likely to provoke a serious economic crisis in the North. Such a crisis may result in regime disintegration and political turmoil.
Therefore, China has to remain careful in its dealings with Pyongyang. It will probably become far more demanding and pushy with the North, but it is highly unlikely that China will play all its cards. It is true that Beijing does not like a nuclear-armed and provocative North Korea, but there is good reason to believe that it would like a unified Korea even less.
One should therefore expect Chinese decision makers to continue to support Pyongyang, with their noses held.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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