Nationalism, East Asian style

By Andrei Lankov

In the last decades of the twentieth century, particularly after the Cold War, it was widely believed that nationalism was retreating from international politics ― at least among the most developed nations. The election of Donald Trump in the United States, Brexit, and the strong support of the once-fringe National Front party in France reverses this trend as an apparent backlash against globalization and liberalism has become an important feature of political discourse. Though these developments are recent manifestations, nationalism has been a constant in one part of the world. This area is East Asia.

Nationalism in a form recognizable to us today first emerged in the late nineteenth century. Earlier eras had similar conceptions but identities were largely centered on states and monarchies. It is telling that in Korea, for over thousands of years and extending in some form well into the twentieth century, all official communications were conducted in Classical Chinese, the lingua franca of East Asia, until the 1890s; and Koreans did not bother to develop a script for their vernacular speech until the 15th century. This was not exceptional: the Vietnamese script (an ideographic one, not a modern phonetic variety) was developed just a century later

Indeed, the word nation "minjok" as separate from the state, "kuk," first appeared in Korean only in the early 1900s. Perhaps not surprisingly, it was a loanword from the Japanese, as it was at this time Japan began to embrace modern "ethno-nationalism" with its cult of "authentic roots" glorifying the special qualities of a particular ethnic group. Nationalism of this sort began to gain traction some 150 years ago, after the Meiji restoration and the rush to modernize and westernize Japanese society.

The foundations of modern East Asian nationalism were borrowed from an era of hyper-nationalism in Europe around the year 1900. Admittedly, much of this was at the elite level, and it took decades of institutionalized widely-accessed public education before the masses were fully indoctrinated (in China it remains an ongoing process). That ethno-nationalism took hold in East Asia was understandable: It is alluring to believe in the superior qualities of whichever group one belongs to.

In Europe, the mindless slaughter of the First World War, followed by the Holocaust and other atrocities in the Second, led to a repudiation of nationalism, particularly ideas of racial or ethnic distinctiveness. However, despite its own atrocious experiences, there was no dismantlement of nationalism in East Asia. Atrocities during WWII were plausibly argued and attributed to the Japanese, not intrinsic nationalistic beliefs. Most countries ― China, Vietnam and Korea ― rightly imagined themselves as victims.

The Europeans after 1945 had no such excuse. It was clear that fascism was not an exclusively German idea, since in nearly all West European countries Hitler had enthusiastic sympathizers who often cooperated with the Nazi war machine and were sometimes even more brutal than their German counterparts.

It also helped that after the Second World War, Europe was soon incorporated within NATO and, somewhat later, the E.U. The existence of such region-wide closely interconnected institutions helped to contain the allure of nationalism.

In East Asia, however, nationalists of all countries (including, to an extent, even Japan) quickly positioned themselves as victims of a cruel (Western-led) world, and continued to articulate grandiose plans of (ethnic) nationalist revival. It is instructive that all nations in the region have overlapping territorial claims and devote significant political and social capital to supporting these. The recent confrontation in the South China Sea, where the Chinese are trying to realize the fantasies of Chinese map-makers from the 1930s, is an ideal example of such an attitude. Needless to say, similar actions with similarly nonsensical starting points are par for the course throughout the region.

History in East Asia ― at least, as presented in school textbooks and government-sponsored events and publications ― is essentially a chain of mutually exclusive claims to past grandeur. Alleged "historical maps" never fail to include lands currently administered by neighboring sovereign states. Outside influences on one's culture, history, and/or development are predictably deemphasized or outright ignored.

What exist today are the Chinese nationalists that hate and despise the Japanese, strongly dislike the Vietnamese, and are not particularly fond of Koreans. Vietnamese are equally contentious about the Chinese; Koreans believe Japan to be a greater threat than Kim Jong-un; and Japanese nationalists see all of mainland Asia as ungrateful and malicious.

Several years ago an experienced diplomat and scholar from outside the region told me: "For X (his country) it is good that countries of the region hate one another, it helps us, but, gosh, it is so comical sometimes!" Well, it is comical, but it is also dangerous ― and it is not going to change any time soon.

Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.