Allies Need Common Stand on Military Ties, N. Korea

By Ralph A. Cossa

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's first year in office has been a rocky one when it comes to Republic of Korea-U.S. relations (and more generally speaking).

Fortunately, there is a golden opportunity to redefine and reinvigorate this all-important bilateral relationship during Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's impending visit, which comes just a few days before the Lee administration's first anniversary in office

Ralph A. Cossa

During my last visit to Seoul, I sensed a great deal of apprehension about the future direction of the alliance and about the overall expectations of the Obama administration.

A great deal of the consternation is centered on Afghanistan. ``What will we be asked to do to support the Obama administration's planned 'surge' in Afghanistan?" was the most frequently asked question.

I normally answered with a question of my own: ``What is Seoul prepared to do?'' More often than not, this was met with blank stares. Koreans seem more accustomed to Americans coming to Seoul with a list of demands rather than questions.

My sense is this is about to change and Seoul should be prepared for ― or, better yet, should try to set the stage for ― a new American approach.

In order to do this, I would respectfully suggest that President Lee prepare three lists and send them to Secretary Clinton in advance of her visit.

The first should be a list of all the things Korea is already doing to assist the United States in combating terrorism and building peace and stability in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Indian Ocean and elsewhere ― it's a rather long list.

The second list should be an inventory of the type of things that Seoul can reasonably be expected to/will do in the future. Like the first list, this should not be limited to military contributions, but more wide-ranging. There is a great deal of capacity-building needed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and Korea can make a major contribution in this area.

The third list should be a more private one, identifying those things that Washington should not be asking of Seoul. As was painfully discovered last year, asking for too much too soon, or before the political groundwork has been sufficiently laid, can quickly undermine the best of intentions.

Even more important than the three lists is the context in which they should be addressed. At the time of President Lee's inauguration, I suggested that one of the first things his administration needed to do was to issue a broad-vision statement about South Korea's desired future role in Asia and in the world and how the U.S.-ROK alliance fits into this vision. This is even more necessary today.

As President Lee begins his second year in office, he needs to better articulate his vision of where he wants to take Korea domestically, regionally and internationally, and how maintaining a rock solid alliance with Washington will contribute to the accomplishment of his goals.

In the past, South Korean and U.S. leaders used to clearly tout the centrality of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the security assurances contained within it as essential to regional security and prosperity.

During the George W. Bush-Roh Moo-hyun era, such pronouncements were few and very far between; most importantly, there was little or no reference to the importance of the alliance post-reunification.

President Lee should celebrate his first anniversary in office with a clear cut statement of his vision for Korea and for the alliance that sends an unambiguous message that the relationship will prevail, not only as long as the peninsula remains divided, but even after the South and North have reconciled their differences and have either reunified or agreed to peacefully coexist as an interim step in the eventual reunification process. This would set the stage for a joint declaration along the same lines during Secretary Clinton's visit.

Such a statement would send a useful message to North Korea that it cannot isolate Seoul, or trade a normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang for the ROK-U.S. alliance or continued U.S. security guarantees to South Korea. I see no problem with the North seeking security guarantees of its own from Washington in return for denuclearization, but not at the expense of the long-standing alliance relationship.

Washington and Seoul must jointly and firmly lay down this marker now, even as they jointly call for a resumption of both the South-North dialogue and the six-party talks.

Having a common position in dealing with the North is important. Even more important is having a common position in dealing with the future course of our own bilateral military relationship. I have been surprised by the number of ROK officials and security specialists who still are resisting the idea of OPCON transfer ― the handing over of wartime control of ROK forces from the United States to the South Korean military, currently scheduled to take place in 2012.

Forty years ago, when I first stepped foot in Korea as a young Air Force lieutenant, I heard complaints about how the existing ``big brother, little brother" relationship was not viable in the long run. In those days, the ROK was not prepared or able to defend itself without considerable outside help ― North Korea was seen as the stronger of the two, both militarily and (believe it or not) economically. Clearly this is not the case today.

To argue that OPCON transfer is not appropriate today is to argue that the ROK is still not capable of defending itself against an impoverished North Korea whose military capabilities to launch an attack might still be considerable, but whose ability to sustain an act of aggression against the South is virtually non-existent and, unlike during the Cold War, with little prospect of outside support. Both Beijing and Moscow have made it clear that they would not support the North if it initiates hostilities against the South.

This is not to say that the U.S. military no longer has a role to play ― its security umbrella serves as a powerful deterrent against the use of the North's suspected chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, or against any North Korean miscalculation about its own relative inadequacies. But the shift from a leading to a supporting role for the United States is long overdue. It reflects the maturity of the alliance relationship, not its weakening.

In laying out his future vision for the alliance, President Lee needs to be clear about the ROK's willingness to play the leading role in its own defense, just as Secretary Clinton needs to provide assurance that there will be no diminution in America's support and commitment to ROK security. This will help ensure that President Lee's second year in office is more constructive and forward-leaning than the first.

Suggestions
• Spell out what Korea has done/will (and can't) do regionally and globally.

• Lay out future vision for the Republic of Korea (ROK).

• Articulate role of ROK-U.S. alliance in achieving vision.

• Support alliance post-reunification.

• Endorse/prepare for OPCON transfer.

Who Is Ralph A. Cossa?
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS (pacforum@hawaii.rr.com), a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal (www.csis.org/pacfor).