By Troy Stangarone
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In negotiating problems as intractable as the dismantlement of North Korea's weapons programs, setbacks are likely, but need not preclude a successful outcome if the proper groundwork is laid in advance. Something that is more challenging in the current top-down process between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un.
Of course, as the experience of the six-party talks demonstrates, not all negotiations will necessarily lead to success either.
However, the early indications are that some progress was made in narrowing differences. Both sides have also been relatively restrained in their comments after the summit. North Korea has suggested it will not resume testing and the U.S. and South Korea have maintained their suspension of major joint military exercises, indicating a desire on both sides not to close the door on future talks.
The talks, perhaps unsurprisingly, stalled over sanctions, but each side may have approached the summit with unrealistic expectations. For months Pyongyang has insisted that dismantlement must be coupled with sanctions relief.
In Hanoi, North Korea put forward a proposal that called for the United States to agree to the removal of the five most recent U.N. sanctions resolutions in exchange for the dismantlement of its nuclear production facilities at Yongbyon, though not all facilities at the location.
While capping North Korea's ability to make new fissile materials at Yongbyon, the deal would have left North Korea with its existing weapons stockpile and production facilities at other locations still intact, while asking the United States to lift a significant majority of the economic sanctions on North Korea.
This would have risked locking in place North Korea's status as a de facto nuclear weapons state and removing nearly all of the U.S. leverage in the negotiations going forward. This was never an offer the United States would be able to accept.
Similarly, Trump maintained his conviction that he could convince Kim to go "big" and agree to a deal that would lift all of the sanctions in exchange for North Korea dismantling all of its weapons and production facilities, including those outside of Yongbyon. Essentially an offer North Korea has consistently declined over the years.
If the offer in Hanoi was Kim's opening offer rather than the best that North Korea can do, there is the possibility of the two sides reaching a negotiated solution.
The same is true if Trump's offer is the ultimate goal, but perhaps achievable through a series of agreements rather than one all-encompassing agreement. In essence, both sides may need to lower their expectations and work to find a solution that mixes elements of both.
This would mean that Kim will need to accept that the dismantlement of Yongbyon on its own is not worth the removal of most economic sanctions on North Korea to the international community and that relief may be contingent on North Korea following through on its commitments, while the U.S. might need to work toward an interim agreement that could build confidence on both sides.
To get there the top-down approach needs to be modified. The inability of Trump and Kim to reach an agreement on steps toward the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs demonstrates the possibilities and the challenges of the top-down approach.
While the top-down approach gave the United States access to the ultimate decision-maker in North Korea, it can only work if complemented with a robust working-level process.
Stephen Biegun, Trump's envoy for North Korea, struggled to gain access to his North Korean interlocutors until relatively shortly before the summit and the two sides were unable to conclude the type of detailed negations that are needed.
If North Korea engages the U.S. in a robust working-level process, the two sides could work toward resolving most of the issues, even if a few decisions remain for Trump and Kim. In the lead up to Hanoi, the gaps remained too large for the leaders to bridge.
After the breakdown, it will take time to know if this is just a temporary impasse or if the differences between the United States and North Korea are too large to bridge.
In the short term the challenge will be developing a process that will allow the working-level officials to engage in the type of robust negotiations that would allow their leaders to successfully meet at a future summit. If the U.S. and North Korea are unable to do that, there is no reason to believe that a future summit would be more successful than the one in Hanoi.
Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.
